Christopher Miller

11/08/2010 Author: Christopher Miller

Comment: Christopher Miller

Our friends in Brussels have a new way of torturing hedge funds, hot on the heels of the AIFM Directive. The EU Capital Requirements Directive 3 comes into force in January, and the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) will revise its Remuneration Code by then, subject to a consultation that is currently underway.

Most of the rules are not really new, but the changes will broaden the scope of coverage to probably over 2,500 firms, including hedge fund and Ucits managers.

One reason why Directive 3 is being applied not just to large systemic organisations, but also to smaller firms that arguably pose no systemic risk, is that otherwise large firms would be at considerable competitive disadvantage versus hedge funds.

The good news is something called the ‘proportionality’ rule, which means that national regulators have some discretion to apply the rules differently to different participants if the measures would not be proportionate. And the Committee of European Banking Supervisors will shortly publish guidelines for consultation on interpretation of the ‘proportionality’ rule. So this could mean that the FSA’s hands are partly tied when exercising discretion. No one knows yet, even though the rules come into force as soon as January.

Most people will be aware that the contentious parts of the Directive require remuneration above a certain level for certain types of employee to be deferred and partly paid in company shares.

In practical terms, what does it mean for remuneration and bonuses? Well, for a start, you can consider your contract to be voidable if it conflicts with the Code.

The Code stipulates that the most productive people, those earning a total of over £500,000 ($791,900), will have 60% of their bonuses deferred over three years, and that 50% of bonuses should be paid in the form of shares in the firm. There must also be the ability to claw back bonuses in the event of subsequent losses.

I simply fail to see how some of these measures, when related to most asset managers, contribute to financial stability and prudential soundness. Deferral and relating remuneration to longer periods is sensible, but the rules forcing firms to pay employees with shares in the management company are very questionable.

When applied to hedge fund managers, this is not just disproportionate, it is completely ridiculous, because it wouldn’t work, and even if it did it would not have any benefit.

To start with, many hedge fund profits are paid out as dividends or partnership profits anyway, and this potentially forces the owner to dilute shareholding.

The lack of benefit stems from the fact that traders’ interests are always aligned with shareholders interests anyway through sharing the performance fee, which is itself quite short-term; and of course, this has no effect on systemic risks.

If, because of the competition issues, the FSA is forced to put pressure on smaller firms, my view is that the remuneration should take dividend entitlement into account, but instead of forced deferral by investment in management company shares, the investment should be in client vehicles. This is not an unusual thing, and aligns managers well with both clients and the management company.

The big message is that to avoid excessive risk taking in hedge funds, investors have long since preferred manager co-investment, and this would formalise something which is quite common anyway in the more reputable houses.
Interestingly, when the FSA applied its previous Remuneration Code to larger firms, it found that all of them already had similar deferral and shareholding rules in place, and some of them were even stricter. Ironically, some firms actually relaxed their rules in response to the Code.

EU governments are not doing this exercise for their own benefit. In addition to deferral of fiscal revenues, the deferral of receipt of the bonus delays when it can be spent, which slows down the velocity of money in the system, impacting GDP and multiplier fiscal revenues. So this hurts pretty much everyone, except the inevitable cohorts of people employed to implement it. Let us trust that the FSA finds some other benefits in its cost/benefit analysis.

Christopher Miller is CEO of Investment Quotient, a financial research consultancy

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