Book/Report Reviews

Corporate governance, regulation and bank risk-taking

Federal Reserve Bank of New York Corporate Finance of Financial Intermediaries Conference Paper by Luc Laeven and Ross Levine

In this paper, Laeven and Levine evaluate the impact of ownership structure, franchise value, investor protection laws and bank regulations on the risk-taking behavior of banks around the world. Thus, they simultaneously examine an individual bank’s private governance structure and the policy environment in which it operates. In contrast, past work examines subsets of these factors. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (2002) cross-country study of deposit insurance and banking crisises does not control for regulations designed to limit bank risk-taking or for bank-level governance traits. In turn, Saunders et al. (1990) and Demsetz et al. (1997) show how ownership structure, franchise value and other bank-level characteristics influence bank risk-taking in the US. They cannot, however, test whether numerous laws and regulations shape bank risk-taking, and it is unclear whether their results generalise to banks in other countries with different policies. By collecting new data on bank ownership and management and merging it with data on bank regulations and investor protection laws, the authors simultaneously examine the impact of a bank’s private governance arrangements and national policies, along with the potential interactions between the two, on bank risk-taking.

www.ny.frb.org/research/conference/2006/corp_fin_inter.html

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